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In t r o d u c t io n
The story of the “cognitive turn’" in the social sciences and the humanities 
over the last 20-30 years is partially a story of a renewed interest in the 
phenomenon of metaphor.1 The “cognitive” theory of metaphor, proposed 
by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), emphasizes the conceptual nature of 
metaphors.2 It claims that metaphor has to do first of all with thinking, not 
with speaking. Metaphors in language are regarded as a function of the 
metaphorical structure of our conceptual system.3 This approach has made 
metaphor an interesting object of research for scientists beyond linguistics 
and literary science. Work based on the cognitive theory of metaphor 
(further: CTM) has been fruitfully conducted within psychology (Ortony 
1979, 1993; Gardner 1985; Indurkhya 1992, 1994; Sinha in prep.; and 
many others), archaeology (e.g. Mithen 1997). anthropology (Fernandez 
ed. 1991), and economy (e.g. MacCIoskey 1985), to name just a few 
examples.
This adoption of the CTM framework by different scientists with 
different interests has however made visible certain drawbacks of the 
“standard” theory. One such drawback is the neglect of social and cultural 
aspects of cognitive activity in the theoretical modelling of metaphors and 
metaphor use. This neglect has been criticised mainly by researchers doing 
analyses of metaphors in authentic discourses from the viewpoint of 
different disciplines.4 But although the need for such a development in the 
CTM has been stated by defenders of the CTM themselves in recent years 
(Cienki 1999; Gibbs 1999; Dirven (ed.) 2002 and others), more concrete 
research is still needed.
In this paper we will sum up our thoughts on the cultural aspects of 
metaphor, which have arisen in the course of our empirical work on public, 
especially media, discourses on politics (Hellsten 1997; Hellsten & Renvall 
1997; Zinken 2002; Zinken in prep.a and b). biotechnology (Nerlich et
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6al., 2000; 2001; 2002 a and b. in press; Hellsten 2000; 2001; 2002), 
epidemics (Nerlich et al. 2002a) and biodiversity (Valiverronen & Hellsten 
2002).
We claim that metaphor, as a device for understanding many aspects 
of reality is “cultural” in two global respects. The first has to do with the 
“cultural foundations” of cognitive systems themselves. The imaginative 
act of seeing something as something else, which underlies much of 
metaphor production, is based on concepts that are culturally shaped. When 
we think of progress in science in terms of a metaphor like SCIENTIFIC 
PROGRESS IS A FRANKENSTEINIAN ENDEAVOUR, we “lean” on 
an obviously culture-specific concept (FRANKENSTEIN) to interpret 
processes going on in our society. But even strongly “embodied” metaphors 
can be cultural in this sense. When thinking of ACTION as MOVEMENT,
1 take a concept (MOVEMENT) as my cognitive starting point and it 
certainly has a firm basis in bodily experience. However, it has been argued 
that the English notion of MOVEMENT is culturally shaped, that its 
structure is not universal (cf. Foley 1997). It is this culturally shaped notion, 
w'hich serves as the immediate basis for my reasoning about ACTION, not 
my actual movements in the world.5
The second sociocultural aspect of metaphor has to do with the fact 
that certain metaphorical ways of interpreting the world are enacted in 
specific contexts. They then might be taken up, rejected, reformulated 
etc., according to the communicative needs and social points of view of 
the interlocutors. This is what Hellsten (2002) calls the “politics of 
metaphor” . For example, the metaphor of CLONES ARE MASS 
PRODUCTS can be used for opposing purposes depending on the 
reformulations of the concept “mass products” : they may be perfect human 
beings or, perhaps lousy copies. These two formulations of the metaphor 
may be used to either support cloning or to oppose it (Hellsten, 2000).
These two, rather neglected, aspects of metaphorical activity, (1) the 
cultural situatedness of cognition, and (2) the communicative uses of 
metaphors, are closely interwoven. It makes sense, though, to describe 
them separately, because they are about the structure of the cognitive system 
and about its dynamics, respectively. The following two sections of this 
article will explore first the structure then the dynamics.
2. Metapho ric  Cogn iti o n  an d  C u l t u r a l  S itua te dn ess
Problem-solving is determined to a large degree by problem-setting (Schon 
1993/1979). This holds not only for policy-making, but also for scientific
7theorising. It is obvious that the differences in approaches to the 
phenomenon of metaphor are based on what different authors choose as 
their best example for a metaphor. The differences within linguistics alone 
are significant: Whereas for some researchers, “freshness”, which causes 
difficulties in the comprehension process, is a defining criterion of metaphor 
(Keller 1995, Searle 1993), proponents of the CTM call metaphors what 
lay people would, in fact, not recognise as a metaphor, such as “my life 
has come to an end” (based on the conceptual metaphor: LIFE IS A 
JOURNEY).
Authors subscribing to different theories of metaphor thus narrow 
their perspective on metaphor to some degree. This works as long as the 
theorising is based on made-up examples. In authentic discourse, however, 
one can find all types of metaphor: conventional (or conceptual) ones (such 
as “take a step into the right direction”), not regarded as metaphorical by 
some, as well as “fresh” ones (such as “NATO nazis“ (V. Kennedy, 2000), 
dismissed as rather uninteresting by those supporting the CTM. Both types 
of metaphor have important functions in discourse and thus have to be 
theoretically accounted for. The distinction between conventional and fresh 
metaphors correlates significantly with the distinction between bodily based 
(correlational) and culturally based (intertextual) metaphors.6
The CTM takes the bodily experience that individuals have of their 
physical surroundings to be the source of imaginative and conceptual 
activity. In this section, we want to suggest that a person's cultural 
situatedness, the experience s/he makes in the interaction with other people 
and within specific cultural contexts, is another important source of 
imaginative and conceptual activity. We will first be examining the 
significance of culturally based metaphors in authentic discourse. Then 
we want to show why the standard version of the CTM cannot account for 
metaphorical activity in its whole discursive complexity. Finally, we will 
make a few suggestions about how to account for metaphorical imagination 
with regard to body and culture.
Int er tex tu al  and  Co r r e l a t io n a l  Me t a ph o rs
In authentic discourse (especially discourse dealing with topics of public 
and popular interest, such as science and politics), linguistic metaphors 
can be found in nearly every sentence.7 From a cognitive point of view 
this should not be surprising. We discursively negotiate all aspects of social 
life, but in particular abstract topics that have not yet been fully 
conceptualised and have not yet been given a ready communicable form.
8Metaphor is known to be a helpful device for these purposes. Thus, when 
analysing authentic discourse, we frequently find metaphors that use the 
logic of conceptual domains such as PATH, MOTION, ENCLOSURE, 
etc. to reason about abstract phenomena that lack such a spatial existence. 
Consider metaphors like the following:
We can’t take any more foreigners into our boat; THE STATE IS A 
BOAT or “Cancer research took again a small step forward”; 
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS IS A JOURNEY
The motivation for such metaphors can to some degree be explained within 
the standard framework of the CTM.The notion of the BOAT is, of course, 
culture-specific, in so far as different cultures have developed different 
kinds of vehicles. But the metaphorical implication that is most relevant 
for political reasoning is motivated by the notion of ENCLOSURE, the 
fact that there is limited space on a boat. A metaphor like THE STATE IS 
A BOAT is ultimately grounded in experientially primary scenes that make 
certain metaphorical projections sensible to us -  and this is where the 
CTM and the theory of image schemata, such as container-contained, path- 
goal, etc., comes into its own. In the boat case a primary scene in our 
experience, in which we see the correlation between an increase of materia! 
and decrease of space in a container (a cup, box etc.) should be relevant. 
Similarly, the notion of JOURNEY makes use of the bodily experiences 
of MOTION in space, and PATH. Grady (1999) calls such conceptual 
metaphors correlational metaphors because their construction is motivated 
by the experience of correlation in cognitive ontogeny -  e.g. the recurrent 
correlation of motion with achieving something.8
Going now beyond such examples, one should stress that in authentic 
discourse, we also regularly encounter metaphors that cannot be accounted 
for with reference to recurrent nonverbal experience and image schemata, 
such as CONTAINERS. Yet this is the standard version of the CTM (and 
also of extensions to it, as proposed by Grady). Consider these examples:
We don’t want science to produce new Frankensteinian monsters. 
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS IS A FRANKENSTEINIAN 
ENDEAVOUR “Jeff is a gorilla” A ROUGH PERSON IS A 
GORILLA
Metaphors like these differ from correlational metaphors or metaphors 
analysed in the CTM, in so far as they are grounded in a type of experience 
that is necessarily cultural. The source concepts of the above metaphors
9are built up through the experience of culturally salient texts, where the 
notion of text has to be understood in a broad sense, including novels, 
films, the media, art as well as school knowledge and knowledge about 
cultural history. The key notion unifying this type of cultural knowledge is 
that of a stereotype (Putnam 1975) 9. We would like to call metaphors 
using this type of source concept intertextual metaphors (Zinken 2002).10 
Correlational and intertextual metaphors differ in some respects: The 
metaphorical character of intertextual metaphors is much more easily 
noticed than that o f correlational metaphors. They tend to be less 
conventionalised. This does not mean, however, that they are the product 
of a rhetoric genius; they are firmly grounded in a group’s cultural 
imagination. Another difference, linked to the reduced conventionality of 
intertextual metaphors, is that they use the logic of a certain concept and 
the associated popular script or myth (cf. Turney 1998) (e.g. 
FRANKENSTEIN) rather than of a relatively abstract conceptual domain 
(e.g. ENCLOSURE) as correlational metaphors do. Nevertheless, both 
correlational and intertextual metaphors function against the background 
of more complex cultural narratives of the world, often those of (wild) 
nature and (human) culture (Hellsten, 2002).
Authors within the CTM-framework have focused on strongly 
conventionalised metaphors that are pervasive in everyday language (so 
called conceptual metaphors). However, for discourse studies and media 
studies, the less conventional intertextual metaphors certainly are 
interesting. Statistical analyses have shown (Zinken in prep.b) that in a 
representative sample of political discourse correlational metaphors were 
more frequent than intertextual metaphors. However, intertextual metaphors 
appeared in a much higher percentage in headlines, first and last parts of 
articles, and texts under photographs, that is in those parts of newspaper 
articles that stay in the readers’ minds. It can thus be argued that intertextual 
metaphors that build on culturally salient stereotypes and not on general 
bodily experience play a central role in conscious “problem-setting” on 
the text level (Schon 1993).
Th e  P iage t -me ta pho r  of  Ima g in a ti on
If culture plays an important role in producing and understanding 
metaphors, then the influence of an individual’s cultural situatedness on 
the development of his/her imaginative capacities should be theoretically 
modelled. In Cognitive Linguistics, imagination is seen to arise from human 
experience. The notion of experience is construed in a broad sense:
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‘Experience’ is thus not taken in the narrow sense of the things that 
have ‘happened to happen’ to a single individual. Experience is instead 
construed in the broad sense: the totality of human experience and 
everything that plays a role in it -  the nature of our bodies, our 
genetically inherited capacities, our modes of physical functioning in 
the world, our social organisation, etc. (Lakoff 1987, 266)
In this quote the individual’s cultural situatedness is at least alluded to in 
terms o f ‘social organisation’. This shows that there is by no means a stark 
divide between the cognitive linguistic research agenda and what we are 
proposing to do. In the following section, we want to illustrate one factor 
that might have caused a bias in Cognitive Linguistics in favour of 
individual bodily experience at the cost of cultural situatedness. We claim 
that work in Cognitive Linguistics has been carried out on the basis of a 
theoretical model based, at least implicitly, on Piaget’s metaphor of 
imagination (Zinken 2002).
Imagination is a notion of central importance in those cognitive 
sciences that go beyond the computational paradigm. It is therefore 
surprising to find that in Cognitive Linguistics there has been relatively 
little explicit theorising about this concept, and this despite Johnson’s 
(1987) early attempt at founding cognitive linguistics on a new theory of 
imagination. The concept of image schema, which Johnson introduced as 
part of this theory, has, by contrast, been very widely discussed.
According to Johnson (1987), an approach that gives due credit to the 
role of imagination in cognition has been furthesr developed in Kant’s 
later works. Two of Kant’s ideas on imagination" in particular have been 
taken up by Johnson. First of all the Kantian notion of schema has inspired 
Johnson to develop his notion of image-schema. Kant had proposed that 
imagination does not simply reproduce what has been experienced (that 
was the traditional Aristotelian standpoint), but that the human mind 
actively organises experience. Imagination thus expresses schematised 
experience. Johnson’s image-schemata are similarly construed. The “rich 
images” of actual experience are abstracted into schemata that show their 
sensual origin but nevertheless serve as cognitive models for rational 
thought. Note that it is the daily recurrent experience we have of our body 
in its physical environment which leads Jo the construction of image- 
schemata: the experience of ingesting and excreting food causes the 
construction of an image schema CONTAINER, the experience of crawling 
somewhere causes'the construction of an image-schema SOURCE-PATH- 
GOAL, etc. Thinking thus emerges ontogenetically from action, it is based
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on our experience of operating, handling and manipulating things and on 
the fact that the human body is subject to certain physical forces.
In the act of imagination the individual focuses his/her consciousness 
onto a part of the cognitive structure constructed in this way and re-
organises it in order to arrive at creative solutions for cognitive tasks. To 
support his claim Johnson quotes Kant:
Kant saw that the mind does not go about only with a fixed stock of 
concepts under which it organizes what it receives through its senses. 
It also engages in the creative act of reflecting on representations in 
search of novel orderings of them, which thereby generates new 
meaning. (Johnson 1987, 157)
Johnson’s neo-Kantianism shows some interesting parallels with the genetic 
epistemology of Jean Piaget. As Chris Sinha points out:
The psychologist most associated with the development of 
schematization in ontogenesis, however, is Jean Piaget.12
Piaget must be counted as a major, if somewhat ambiguous, forerunner of 
cognitive linguistics, and of current CL-inspired work in developmental 
psychology. Piaget’s account of sensori-motor development in infancy is 
one in which successive re-organizations and co-ordinations of action 
schemata, arising from bodily movement and interactions with the physical 
world, lead to increasingly abstract cognitive representations (or 
internalized operational structures). The dynamic processes that underpin 
cognitive development are designated as assimilation, accommodation and 
equilibration (Sinha, in prep.)
The concept of schema is central to Piaget’s thinking. In his view the 
child abstracts these schemata from the interaction with the physical 
surroundings, and the reflective combination and reorganization of 
schemata leads to a conceptual system. Here Piaget, like Johnson, is 
influenced by Kantian ideas. But there is a further parallel between the 
concepts of schema in genetic epistemology and in Cognitive Linguistics. 
This has to do with the question as to why people can share meanings and 
arrive at a common understanding of aspects of the w'orld despite the 
ultimate individuality of experience. The need to answer this question had 
led Kant to the invention of schemas. This concept is designed to explain 
how individual, singular experience can lead to an intersubjective 
conceptual system. Kant’s solution is to claim that schemas are given a 
priori, that they are subject to objective, universal laws which are
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independent of human experience. In this respect Piaget departs from 
Kant, and Johnson too can hardly accept it, because one c f  the most 
important claims made by cognitive linguists is that language and thought 
are based on subjective experience and universal pre-conceptual structures, 
but not a priori, objective concepts.
Thus, Johnson’s image-schemas are not given to mankind from above. 
They are rooted in sensual experience.They do not only organise experience 
(which is the Kantian element), they are also themselves construed through 
experience (which is the neo-Kantian element). But nevertheless Johnson 
wants them to be seen as universal cognitive models, as the basis of a 
shared rationality. It is obvious that, given the neo-Kantian stance on the 
genesis of schemata, this can only mean that image-schemata give form 
and structure to supposedly13 (plus or minus 7, one might say, 
paraphrasing George Miller, 1956) universal aspects of human experience. 
Only with respect to universal of human living can it be sensible to claim 
that image-schemas are construed through bodily experience and at the 
same time objective. These pre-conceptual ‘wirings’ in our heads are the 
reason, claim Johnson and his followers, why it makes sense for us to talk 
of continents or relationships as of containers: ‘in Europe’, ‘in our 
relationship’ and so on. Such linguistic practice is seen as a function of 
our most basic bodily experiences. This is where we see a third parallel 
between Piaget and Cognitive Linguistics: language expresses, not causes, 
cognitive development.
Let us repeat that cognitive linguists are explicitly not interested in 
what has “‘happened to happen’ to a single individual” (Lakoff 1987,266). 
However, bodily experience ultimately is the experience of individuals -  
as long as language is assigned a minor role in cognitive development, as 
it is the case in the Piaget-Metaphor of imagination.
T h e  Inte ra ct io n  of  Body  and  C u l t ur e
Humans are not the only beings capable of building image-schemata and 
concepts -  other primates also show these abilities to some extent 
(Tomasello 1999). The specific cognitive and imaginative abilities that 
humans possess therefore seem to be linked to the fact that humans inherit 
the results of cognitive activity built up (in the Humboldtian sense) through 
linguistic and cultural symbols transmitted by their conspecifics. The claim 
that thought is embodied, an important notion in Cognitive Linguistics, 
does not only mean that human cognition is enabled and restricted by the 
way our bodies function, it also means that human cognition is influenced
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by the process of taking ‘outer’, symbolised ognition into the body in 
ontogenesis. The role of linguistic and symbolic communication with the 
others is crucial, for humans. Not only do our bodies shape the range of 
possible human cultures; the culture we grow up in also shapes the 
experiential space of our bodies. The goal of theoretical modelling in 
Cognitive Linguistics thus should be to view body and culture as two levels 
of experience of the ecologically situated actant. In linguistic activity these 
levels constantly intermesh.
A different notion of embodiement, helpful in broadening the 
theoretical basis of the CTM, may be derived from Bourdieu’s theory of 
habitus. According to Bourdieu the habitus is a durable system of 
dispositions which is not exterior to a person. It is not like a set of rules 
that a person knows about. Rather it might be said that a person is habitus: 
“Ce qui est appris par corps n’est pas quelque chose que l’on a, comme un 
savoir que 1’on peut tenir devant soi, mais quelque chose que Ton est” 
(Bourdieu 1980, 123). Habitus has a social genesis, it is a result of the 
naturalisation of the culturally arbitrary' (Bourdieu 1977, 87fF.)14. The 
emphasis here is therefore not on the construction of cognitive structure 
out of bodily (individual) experience but on the organisation of bodily 
experience inside a culture, inside a social context.15
Such a theory chimes in with a theory of metaphor developed by 
Weinrich (1958; see also Jakel 1999) and could be used to broaden the 
theoretical remit of modern theories of metaphor. Weinrich treated 
conventional metaphors such as THE WORD IS A COIN as parts of image- 
fields (Bildfelder) which are not so much part of languages, but of larger 
cultural communities, and that are used naturally and unconsciously in 
language and thought. From a “cultural” point of view, it seems reasonable 
to view a culture’s system of conventional or conceptual metaphors as a 
habitus that is naturalised in the ontogenetic process of imitatively learning 
clusters or patterns of consistent linguistic metaphors.
According to Tomasello, habitus is one major influence on a child’s 
cognitive development. The other one is active instruction:
I will distinguish two ways in which the human cultural environment 
sets the context for the cognitive development of children: as cognitive 
'habitus’ and as a source of active instruction from adults. (Tomasello 
1999, 79)
Now. if we regard discourse as a form of continued cognitive development, 
then we can view conventional metaphors -  which most often have
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conceptual source domains that build on procedural knowledge -  and 
'fresh’ metaphors -  which very often have source concepts that are in 
some sort socially and culturally salient -  as two types of influence on 
discourse. Whereas a culture’s conventional metaphors function as habitus, 
the metaphorical pursuit of communicative goals is a sort of ‘active 
instruction’ to the audience. It seems that for active instruction, intertextual 
metaphors are especially useful. They are used in specific situations to 
meet certain communicative goals. When representing clones as 
Frankensteinian monsters, linguistically and pictorially, the aim is to evoke 
a negative feeling towards cloning and to set off a train of negative 
associations. A metaphor like “the wages are falling” doesn’t seem to have 
a specific aim in that sense and doesn’t set off this type of cognitive 
associative rippling effect. However, the subjective intentions expressed 
in texts are possible only on the basis of the objective intentions of a cultural 
habitus (Bourdieu 1980).
Another difference between these two types of metaphor is that 
conventional, conceptually based, metaphors are mostly used and 
understood unconsciously, whereas the ‘active instruction’ metaphors are 
used mostly intentionally and can only be understood after actively 
engaging with them. This also means that they can be used for more strategic 
political, social, didactic, and aesthetic or poetic purposes. One should 
stress however that conventional metaphors can always be resurrected 
from their cognitive and social interactive slumber in specific contexts for 
similar purposes. It makes therefore sense to study the uses of the second 
type of culturally grounded and culturally significant metaphors in public 
and media discourses where they can best fulfil their purposes, without 
however forgetting the almost omnipresent appearance of conceptual 
metaphors in such texts and their cumulative effects (see Nerlich, Hamilton 
and Rowe, 2002b)
Take for example conceptual metaphors such as EUROPE IS A 
HOUSE (Chilton & Ilyin 1993; Musolff 2000; Schaffner & Trommer 
1990), THE STATE IS A SHIP (Musolff 1996), or SCIENCE IS A 
JOURNEY (Hellsten 2000, 2002) and their respective linguistic 
expressions, such as “We have to build a better Europe”, “All European 
nations are in the same boat” and “Cancer research took a small step forward 
today” . These metaphorical projections are. as argued above, firmly 
grounded in bodily experience. At the same time, however, notions like 
the HOUSE. SHIP. JOURNEY have strong culture-specific aspects. But 
both tte  conceptual and the cultural foundations of these metaphors might 
never come to the fore of consciousness when readers of newspapers read
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such phrases. This is different in metaphors, such as CLONES ARE 
COPIES, where the cultural image of a clone and the cultural images of 
(photo) copying are of vital importance for the conceptualisation of cloning 
in the popular ‘mind’, something often overlooked by scientists who use 
such phrases in culturally neutral scientific discourse.
But Musolff (2000) has shown that even for metaphors such as 
EUROPE IS A HOUSE the view that we unconsciously map elements of 
the conceptual source domain of buildings onto the conceptual target 
domain of a political entity is a too deterministic and stems from the static 
view cognitivists have of metaphorical mappings. His analyses show that 
discourse participants freely and intentionally take up, reject, or reformulate 
the metaphor o f EUROPE as a HOUSE according to their own 
communicative goals, ratherthan being trapped in the prison of unconscious 
metaphorical mapping16.
This critique might be a bit unfair towards the currant level of theorising 
in the CTM. The claim that inferential structures of the source domain 
structure the target domain is now made only with respect to primary 
metaphors. In secondary metaphors, which build on them, only some 
aspects of the projection are preserved. EUROPE IS A HOUSE is a 
secondary or even tertiary metaphor. It functions against the background 
of more general metaphors such as STATES ARE BUILDINGS and 
INSTITUTIONS ARE BUILDINGS. These are grounded on primary 
metaphors such as FUNCTIONING IS LINKAGE, PERSISTENCE IN 
TIME IS STANDING UPRIGHT, and on the image-schema container. 
Only these structurings might be claimed to have some cognitive impact 
on the conceptualisation of EUROPE as a HOUSE.
We claim that the more a metaphor is based on culture-specific 
concepts (e.g. HOUSE), the more elements of cultural, textual knowledge 
determine the sense of the metaphor. An example within the metaphor of 
the EUROPEAN HOUSE would be to talk about the nations LIVING 
TOGETHER in that house (“The European nations should be living 
together like a real family”). This would be an intertextual metaphor, 
because it is not only grounded in the experiential stereotype of the family 
as it really is, but on the mythical-textual stereotype of the family as it 
should be.17 However, such images, which are primarily cultural, have a 
slightly different epistemological status than the source concepts of 
correlational metaphors, which are tied to procedural knowledge acquired 
in bodily experience. Cultural imagination does not determine individual 
cognition, it is more like an offer to individual cognition. This is what 
Musolff (2000) highlights. Such an offer seems to be especially testing.
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when it is, bottom up, bound to general procedural knowledge, and at the 
same time, top-down, bound to culture-specific values, myths, and 
perspectives. This is the case with basic-level-mappings:
CULTURAL MODELS
Table 1: Sources of metaphoricity interacting in the formation of basic- 
level-mappings in discourse.
Motivating (linguistic) 
intertextual metaphors
Motivating (linguistic) 
conventional metaphors
LIVING T O G E T H E R  LIKE A REAL 
FAMILY;
PO SITIV E/N EG A TIV E 
RO LE M O D E L S (S IM PSO N S, 
W A L T O N S,...); etc. 
B A SIC -L EV EL -M A PPIN G S 
EU R O PE IS A H O U SE 
CO RR EL A TIO N A L M A PPIN G S
STATES A R E  BU ILD IN G S; 
IN ST IT U T IO N S A R E  B U ILD IN G S 
PE R S IST E N C E  IN TIM E IS STANDING 
U PR IG H T;
FU N C T IO N IN G  IS LIN KA G E 
IM A G E SCH EM A TA  
H O R IZ O N T A U V E R T IC A L ;
LINK;
C O N T A IN ER
Metaphor as a cognitive phenomenon can therefore be seen as cultural in 
important ways - the cognitive and cultural aspects of metaphors
complement each other, they should not be seen as mutually exclusive. 
Conventional metaphors are a cultural heritage that we inherit and ‘embody’ 
during ontogeny. The conscious use of metaphor in discourse draws most 
often not on bodily experience, but on elements of an image of the world 
that is socially and culturally pre-structured. Both types of imaginative 
activity, the behaviour in terms of the objectified habitus, and the action in 
form of construing metaphors that make sense from our socially defined 
point of view, form the basis of cultural imagination.
3. T h e  Poli tics  o f  Me t a ph o r
We have argued that metaphoric cognition is culturally situated and 
structured. Correlational metaphors, such as A STATE IS A BOAT, use 
concepts that are culturally shaped, and there is a wide array of intertextual
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metaphors, such as CLONES ARE COPIES that cannot be reduced to our 
bodily experiences with the physical environment. However, metaphors 
are not only important cognitive tools in making sense of the world but 
also in communicating about the world with others. In this section we will 
turn to the communicative (dynamic) aspects of metaphor use.
In discourse the participants try to contribute to the organisation of 
parts of social reality. Metaphor is a valuable instrument here, because it 
suggests a certain perspective on a given problem in a catchy way. At the 
same time this perspective is flexible enough to allow for several 
interpretations that can be negotiated with others in ongoing discourse18. 
An important part of the discursive negotiation of social reality consists of 
taking up, reformulating or rejecting proposed metaphors. Chilton and 
Ilyin (1993) call this the interactional function of metaphor. This interaction, 
which leads to the establishment of certain metaphorical views on a topic, 
is obviously a social and cultural phenomenon, and thus a second cultural 
dimension of metaphor.
Let us now examine an example from authentic political discourse. In 
the discursive interpretation of the end of communism in Middle and 
Eastern Europe, most authors in Polish newspapers tend to describe the 
changes in terms of the metaphor of CHANGE AS MOTION (Zinken in 
prep.b). However, in post-socialist discourse, there sometimes appear 
metaphors that conceptualise the change leading to the transformation of 
a system as a RIPENING PROCESS. These metaphors can be found in 
Polish as well as in German post-socialist discourse (Zinken in prep.a). 
They make sense from a certain ideological point of view, as they hide the 
fact that it was the active, dangerous commitment of the political opposition 
that actually lead to the transformation. The ‘organic’ view on politics 
construed through plant-metaphoricity generally takes away the 
responsibility for the change from the socialist politicians -  if political 
change is a ripening process, then there is little that people can do about it. 
These metaphors are used strategically and intentionally to shift possible 
political blame and influence public opinion.
The communicative function of metaphors consists of three processes. 
First, the selection of one metaphor instead of any other -  this may lead to 
different views on the topic. Second, the selected metaphor can be 
elaborated in different ways -  these different elaborations or formulations 
may lead to different cultural views on the topic. Third, these re-
formulations of conventional metaphors and the introduction of new 
metaphors may lead to semantic changes -  this is a temporal process 
(Hellsten 2002). The first two processes are intentional and interactional.
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the third is their unintentional cumulative result (see Keller 1994). All 
three processes are the dynamics of metaphor use.
Se le c ti o n  of  Met aphors
Metaphors are effective in communication because they restrict the 
complexity of issues. In communication every metaphor opens up one 
perspective at a time on an issue (Burke, 1989). However, in society there 
are always many possible perspectives on issues. The same issue can be 
metaphorised in many ways. Some of these metaphors compete with each 
other.
For example, it is quite common to use the metaphor of POLITICS IS 
A GAME in discussing the competition between political candidates (“if 
he plays his game right, he can win the election”, “she has put her cards on 
the table in the campaign leaflet”). At the same time, the metaphor of 
POLITICS IS A JOURNEY is also commonly used, for instance when 
talking about “the race between the candidates“, “the speech was the first 
step towards a new political programme”. These two metaphors are 
conventional ways of talking about politics. The metaphor of POLITICS 
IS DANCE would offer an unconventional view on politics, and perhaps, 
change the perspective heuristically.
The selection of one of the metaphors instead of another is a social 
and cultural phenomenon, and it depends on the context of the use as well 
as the puipose of the user. Whereas the metaphor of POLITICS IS A GAME 
highlights the competitive aspects of politics, the metaphor of POLITICS 
IS A JOURNEY focuses more on the processual aspect of politics. These 
two popular metaphors offer competing views on politics and may influence 
the actions that are taken. POLITICS IS A GAME suggests that citizens 
are spectators of a game played by different political actors (Hellsten & 
Renvall 1997). The  ^metaphor of POLITICS IS A JOURNEY may also 
include citizens as active participants in politics. The selection of one 
metaphor instead of another often encompasses ideological functions. What 
guides the selection of certain (mostly intertextual) metaphors from a 
possible pool of conventional metaphors, falls outside of the remit of the 
CTM. However, it is studied more often in analyses of popular discourses.
Ref ormulation  of  Met a ph o rs
The selection of one metaphor instead of another is a social and cultural 
process that takes place in the communication between the participants in 
a debate. Further, metaphors are ambiguous and they can be formulated as
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to fit in the intended communicative goals. The reformulation of the selected 
metaphors is culturally grounded and takes place in the process of 
communication. If the two terms of the metaphor, such as CLONES and 
MASS PRODUCTS, have many properties in common from which to 
select, metaphors can be used for even contrary purposes. This flexibility 
makes them important tools in communications.
For example, in the debate about cloning Dolly the sheep the same 
metaphor CLONES ARE MASS PRODUCTS was used both to support 
and to oppose cloning -  depending on its further elaborations, where mass- 
products can either be seen as being perfect doubles or perfect copies of 
body-parts (so called spare parts) or else as inferior and therefore less 
valuable copies (see Hellsten 2000; Nerlich et al, 2000). Although both 
views are based on the view that cloning is a form of mass-production, 
these two images lead to very different views on the issue. The concept of 
MASS PRODUCTION can therefore be regarded as an intertextual 
metaphor steeped in a long tradition of western industrial production 
methods and linked to the western concept of PROGRESS. The concept 
of progress itself has deep historical roots in western societies and, since 
the enlightenment, mainly positive connotations. These positive 
connotations o f ‘progress’ may lead to situations where the opponents of 
certain scientific innovation are negatively categorised as opposing progress 
in general. The word clone by contrast has mainly negative connotations, 
given the appearance of clones in dystopian sci-fi novels and the use of 
that metaphor therefore provokes highly negative associations.
Especially the basic level metaphors play an important role in public 
discourses because they are flexible enough to allow for several 
interpretations while maintaining a basic set of conventional associations. 
On the other hand, highly conventionalized metaphors such as “the wages 
are falling” are seldom formulated any further.
The ambiguous and flexible use of metaphors has not yet attracted 
much attention in the CTM tradition, although it seems-to contradict, at 
least partially, Lakoff & Johnson’s (1980) thesis that metaphors are used 
largely unconsciously.We contend that in public debates, metaphors are 
often used purposefully and consciously to highlight, defend or attack 
certain views about socially relevant issues
T h e  D ynamics  of  M e t a ph o r
The selection and the formulation of such politically charged metaphors is 
a complex process of communications, often a debate between antagonists.
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Some of the metaphors created in these debates are conventionalised in 
use, and new metaphors and new formulations of the metaphors have to be 
introduced all the time to keep the debate going. Metaphors live in use. 
The dynamics of metaphors is based on the conventionalisation of the 
selected metaphors and their reformulations over time (Hellsten 2002). 
For example, the metaphor of GENES ARE THE LETTERS OF LIFE, 
very popular in the debates on modem genetics, is based on a long line of 
metaphors, most notable those of NATURE IS A BOOK used from 
Antiquity onwards. It has a long history in the Judeo-Christian tradition 
where it referred to natural, eternal and universal texts (Kay 2000, 31). 
Later, in the debates on genetics it refers to a book of life which we as 
humans have to learn to read, and more recently, to rewrite (Nelkin & 
Lindee 1995; Hellsten 2001; Nerlich et al. 2002a). The meaning of this 
metaphor has changed over time through being used in a variety of social, 
cultural and political contexts. Again, this dynamic process o f 
metaphorising seems to fall outside of the focus of the CTM, but has been 
studied in the social studies of science and in the history of science.
Some’ recent accounts in the social studies of science have focused on 
the role of (intertextual) metaphors as a tool of exchange between and 
within discourses (Bono 1990,71 -72), as ‘messengers of meaning’ (Maasen 
& Weingart 1995), and as a means for knowledge transfer between different 
domains (Maasen 1994; Maasen & Weingart 2000). In these approaches 
metaphor is considered as important because it provides the participants 
with a common point of departure. This common point of departure has 
to be also flexible to allow for reformulations. In this, metaphors may 
prove to be indispensable. The common point of departure is the result of 
temporal processes of negotiating the metaphors and their formulations.
The temporal dynamics of metaphors has to do with the different 
generalisation levels oftlie metaphors. The level of linguistic expressions, 
such as “the race between the political candidates” or “steps in the right 
direction” show the most significant variation and diversity. The next level, 
the basic-level mapping, such as POLITICS IS A GAME or LIFE IS A 
JOURNEY, allows for a wide variety of linguistic expressions while 
maintaining a noticeable structure. The most general level which deals 
with wide narratives about the world, such as MOTION IN PLACE IS 
DEVELOPMENT IN TIME, remains the same despite the different 
formulations. These different levels seem to change according to different 
time scales: the narrative level is more stable than the intermediate level, 
which is more stable than the linguistic level (Hellsten 2002). The 
interaction between these different levels of metaphor provides
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communication with both a common ground (Maasen & Weingart 1995) 
and flexibility in the interpretations (Hellsten 2000).
In summary, the second cultural aspect of metaphor, the communicative 
function of metaphors, consists of the selection, reformulation and the 
change of metaphors over time and in various contexts. Metaphors co-
evolve in the cultural practices of specific societies. One part of cultural 
practice is popular imagination. To close this article we shall briefly 
examine the role of popular imagination and popular metaphors on the 
public understanding of science and public understanding of risk. In this 
context metaphors can be regarded as both cultural and cognitive tools 
that structure scientific knowledge as well as public understanding.
4. M et a ph o rs  and  Popular  Ima gin at ion
In 1998, at the height of the debate about cloning and genetic modification 
of plants and animals, José van Dijck pointed out that dissemination of 
genetic knowledge is not uniquely contingent on the advancement of science 
and technology, but is equally dependent on the development of images 
and imaginations. ‘Imaginary tools’ are crucial assets in the dissemination 
of genetic knowledge, as they are used to shape this science’s public face’ 
(Van Dijck, 1998: 2-3)
When scientists announced in 1997 that they had been able to clone a 
mammal for the first time, namely Dolly the sheep, public imagination, as 
displayed in the newspapers, on the web and in focus groups went into 
overdrive, exploiting the full potential of intertextual metaphors. We saw 
monsters, androids, armies of little Hitlers, human spare-part factories, 
humans on assembly lines everywhere. Frankenstein and Brave New World 
became the catch-phrases of the day. What was astonishing was that the 
same images, metaphors, stock characters, clichés and cultural narratives 
were used over and over again and are still being used in debates concerning 
the ‘new genetics’, be it GM food, designer babies or stem cells. Some of 
the most stereotypical tools used by the public and the press in public 
discourse about genetics are the following:
Metaphors', clones are copies, clones are products; these metaphors 
then invite mainly negative inferences, such as ‘clones are used as a 
means for an end’ and ‘cloned children are consumer options’;
Intel-textual references: to works of literature, such as Frankenstein 
and Brave New World, or films, such as Boys from Brazil, Gattaca. 
AI, to stock characters (Frankenstein), to sci-fi scenarios (that we will
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create armies of monsters or little Hitlers; that clones will be cyborgs 
or androids), to historical events, such as eugenics and genocide; 
people then base on these references mainly dystopian predictions;
Recurrent themes: ‘gaining immortality’, ‘resurrecting the dead’, 
‘playing God’; these themes run through the factual and fictional 
discourse about cloning; Recurrent argumentative clichés: e.g. opening 
Pandora’s box, crossing a line, taking the next step, or going down a 
slippery slope - again inviting mainly negative inferences; These 
metaphors, images, and argumentative clichés help journalists and 
the public to cut through a dense ethical jungle about cloning and 
other issues, but they can also lead to short-circuiting scientific and 
political arguments. It can be noticed that the linking element 
motivating this variety of imaginative tools is not universal bodily 
experience, but social evaluation.
As Jonathan Miller once said, once a metaphor “ lodges in the 
imagination, it can successfully eliminate or discredit any evidence which 
might be regarded as contradictory” (Miller, 1978). Framing novel issues 
in terms of certain stock images or metaphors, that is as something well 
known, might therefore prevent us from seeing alternative solutions to a 
problem. In this way metaphors can become sources of error or bias. As 
the media sociologist Conrad has pointed out, “how we frame a problem 
often includes what range of solutions we see as possible” (Conrad 1997: 
140). Seeing a social situation or contentious social or genetic issue through 
the glasses of a dominant metaphor might lead us either to overexaggerate 
the risks associated with it or else undervalue the benefits associated with it.
Seeing a factual issue (e.g., cloning through nuclear transfer) through 
the lenses of an intertextual metaphor (clones as replicators, duplicators, 
androids) and in conjunction with stereotypical and culture specific themes 
ana clichés can therefore be as illuminating as it can be adumbrating. This 
demonstrates how dependent some metaphors are on cultural context and 
the political intentions with which they are used and how flexibly they can 
be used in various social, journalistic, scientific and political contexts. In 
such contexts the choice of a metaphor is not only an aesthetic one, but a 
strategic one. It can change the world or prevent it from changing. To 
understand such processes we really have to take metaphor out of the heads 
of individuals and put it in the cultural world (see Gibbs. 1999). In modern 
western societies this world is a supremely technological world, but still a 
world where metaphor plays a major role as mediator between mind, body 
and culture. Why did it take so long, for example, for a real understanding
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of the heart’s function to develop? In his 1978 book The Body in Question, 
Jonathan Miller gives the following explanation:
In primitive societies, where technical images are few and far between 
and very simple at that, most explanatory metaphors are drawn from 
nature.... But the development of technology created a new stock of 
metaphors -  not simply extra metaphors, but ones altogether different 
in their logical character (Miller, 1978: 181)
The invention of the pump and other technological advances made it 
possible to imagine how the heart worked and therefore to understand the 
human body better and to invent better cures for heart disease. Culture, 
bodily experience and technology all interact, with metaphor as the 
mediating device.
N ot es
1 Compare the bibliography on metaphor by Noppen and Hols (1990). also 
Hellsten (2002, 13fT.).
2 The ideas put forward in the cognitive theory' of metaphor didn’t, of course, 
come out of nothing. Very similar ideas have been voiced by the linguist 
Weinrich. as well as by a range of philosophers from Blumenberg back at 
least to Vico. Sec Nerlich & Clarke. (2001) on the interest in metaphor in the 
19th century' German philosophy.
3 There exists a vast introductory literature on cognitive metaphor theory. The 
latest achievement in this field is Kdvecses (2002).
4 The neglect of cultural aspects in metaphoric activity has been extensively 
criticised by Naomi Quinn (Quinn 1987: Quinn & Holland 1987: Quinn 
1991: Quinn 1999). It seems, however, that Quinn has taken her opposition 
to a dangerous extreme, claiming that metaphors do not structure 
understanding but simply express existing cultural models. However, the 
CTM and Quinn’s cultural theory of metaphor share certain similarities, such 
as the adoption of a brain metaphor of (cultural) cognition on both sides 
(l.akoff & Johnson 1999: Quinn & Strauss 1997). Our aim is to make steps 
towards an integration of universal, bodily grounded know ledge and culture- 
specific knowledge used in metaphoric activity rather than claiming a 
supremacy for one aspect.
5 Thus, few people have to deal w ith (literal) obstacles on their (literal) ways. 
Nevertheless, expressions like "overcoming obstacles" are frequently used
by cognitive linguists to illustrate the bodily basis of metaphors such as LIFE 
IS A JOURNEY. Of course. Lakoff(1987) explicitly says that it is not "what 
has happened to happen to a single individual" (...) what motivates metaphors. 
I lowever, in theoretically modelling metaphoric activity. Lakoff and Johnson 
actually build on individual bodily experience, as will be argued below.
6 The two distinctions do not completely overlap and the distinctions made are 
not categorical ones, but should be seen as being situated at two ends of a 
continuum.
7 This begs the complex question of what to count as metaphor in terms of 
"freshness" vs. convention. The largely implicit and intuitive standpoint in 
Cognitive Linguistics seems to be to regard as metaphorical all those 
projections from one domain to another that potentially can be noticed by lay-
persons and to exclude expressions whose metaphorical character can be 
noticed only by experts in etymology.
8 A eulture-specifically correlational metaphor like THE STATE IS A BOAT 
would, in his terminology, be a secondary correlational metaphor.
9 One should mention Black's (1962) interaction view- on metaphor here. In 
metaphor, he claimed, a "system of associated commonplaces" is projected 
onto the target concept. In a later text (Black 1993/1979) he abandoned that 
notion, however in favour of the notion of an "implication complex''. He felt 
(and was criticised by Ricoeur for this), that the notion of commonplace was 
too closely associated with worn-out half-truths, which would downplay the 
creative character of metaphors, their potential to form new semantic relations.
10 Grad} (2002) proposes to account for metaphors like "Achilles is a lion" b% 
sax ing that they are motivated by a resemblance between "Achilles" and "a 
lion", felt by the author of the metaphor. It would lead us to far away from 
the main argument to extensively discuss this approach here, but we think 
that the notion of (subjective) resemblance only partially solves the problems 
that the notion of (objective) similarity has. Resemblance might be the reason 
that an articulated (intertexlual) metaphor is understandable, but it is not the 
motivation for construing such a metaphor in the first place. The distinction 
between metaphors that are primarily bodily motivated and such that are 
culturally motivated has been in the air for some time. Searle (1993/1979) 
distinguished between six types of metaphor that aclixate different types of 
knowledge in the comprehension process. In each case a stereotype is 
cognilix civ profiled according to a specific context (which the target concept 
is part of), and the most salient feature is projected onto the target concept.
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11 Kant wrote about the notion of Einbildung. a notion whose inner form might 
express and suggest other ideas than the notion of imagination. However, we 
are referring to Johnson’s interpretation of Kant, and we will therefore stick 
to Johnson’s terminology.
12 Piaget was a biologist by training and did not designate himself as a 
psychologist; for his interdisciplinary' science of cognitive development used 
the term (coined by James Mark Baldwin) genetic epistemology.
13 In Cognitive Linguistics the rather large step tends to be made from linguistic 
metaphors like "in Europe” to the existence of an image-schema 
CONTAINER. Recent research shows that the cognitive-linguistic story is 
surprisingly complex and variable across languages even in a basic cognitive 
domain such as CONTAINMENT (Bowerman 1996).
14 The notion of arbitrariness might sound to contradict the findings of the 
interlinguistic and intercultural stability of the bodily basis of many conceptual 
metaphors. Nevertheless, these are arbitrary' to some degree: whereas e.g. the 
English talk of MOOD as of a CONTAINER ("I’m in a bad mood”), the 
Finnish talk of MOOD as of a SURFACE (“Olen huonolla tuulella”). This 
Finnish expression ‘tuulella’ is conventionalised to refer to ’mood’ even 
though the _expression literally means "I have a bad wind” Our bodies leave 
space for cultural variation.
15 According to Bourdieu. habitus organizes bodily experience in the most 
fundamental ways, which he illustrates with what he calls the "sexual division 
of labor” (Bourdieu 1977. 931T.).
16 Similarly. I lellsten (2000) has shown the purposeful uses of the metaphor of 
CLONES ARE MASS PRODUCTS in the debate on cloning.
17 On the modality of stereotypes see: BartmiDski/Panasiuk (1993).
18 Metaphors resemble boundary objects (Star & Griesemer 1989). objects that 
are robust enough to carry certain implications while being flexible enough 
to allow lor several formulations and uses
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